Outer Bounds of Safe Harbors: Lehman-Swedbank Decision Limits Setoff Rights Under Swap Agreements
However, a recent decision in the Lehman bankruptcy, involving the setoff rights of a foreign bank, limits the right of setoff under the swap agreement safe harbors by enforcing a timing requirement for setoff found in Bankruptcy Code Section 553(a). Under this decision, a swap participant may continue to net its pre-bankruptcy swap claims against pre-bankruptcy collateral of a counterparty in bankruptcy, but a swap counterparty may not net such claims against post-bankruptcy collateral of the debtor in bankruptcy.
This decision, which the bank has appealed, is notable because of its effect on the bank—prohibiting it from applying millions of dollars in post-bankruptcy deposits by Lehman against Lehman's pre-bankruptcy swap obligations. It is also notable because it establishes an outer boundary on the swap agreement safe harbors, which might otherwise, taken literally, seem to be virtually boundless in scope.
Read the full text of this alert: Outer Bounds of Safe Harbors: Lehman-Swedbank Decision Limits Setoff Rights Under Swap Agreements.
Authors
-
Philip D. Anker
Partner
Chair, Bankruptcy and Creditors’ Rights Litigation Practice Group
[email protected] +1 212 230 8890+1 212 230 8890
-